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ABSTRACT
This study examined the effects of private^ self- 
consciousness and self-esteem on perspective-taking, 
testing the hypothesis that high private self-conscious 
persons with high self-esteem would be best able to take 
the perspective of other individuals. Perspective-taking 
was operationalized as the ability match self-descriptions 
with the correct authors. Two groups of five females were 
recruited as target persons, and participated in a 
videotaped group discussion after providing written free­
form self-descriptions. In a pretest, 66 female subjects 
watched both videotapes, and matched the self-descriptions 
with the target females after each tape. Because no 
convergence was found between the two matching tasks, one 
of the tapes was dropped from further study on the basis 
that it resulted in significantly lower accuracy scores. 
The target females also provided self-descriptive 
adjective lists, and in the final study, 61 female 
subjects, recruited on the basis of their private self- 
consciousness and self-esteem scores, completed a self- 
report measure of perspective-taking and matched both the 
free-form self-descriptions and the adjective lists with 
the target persons appearing on the remaining videotape. 
Overall, subjects were significantly more accurate in 
matching the adjective lists than the free-form self­
descriptions. Self-reported perspective-taking was 
associated with subjects' accuracy in matching the free­
form self-descriptions but not the adjective lists. Lack 
of convergence between the two matching tasks was also 
evidenced by a nonsignificant correlation between the two 
accuracy scores. Test of the main hypothesis showed that 
only self-esteem had an effect on perspective-taking, and 
only when the task was to match the adjective lists, such 
that high self-esteem subjects were significantly more 
accurate than lows. Private self-consciousness had no 
effect on subjects' performance on either matching task, 
and the analysis failed to show a significant interaction. 
The results are discussed in terms of their implications 
to self-consciousness, self-esteem and perspective-taking.
PRIVATE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF-ESTEEM, AND PERSPECTIVE-
TAKING
2Private Self-Consciousness, Self-Esteem, and Perspective-
Taking
According to Duval and Wicklund's (1972) theory of 
objective self-awareness, attention can be directed either 
inward toward the self or outward toward the environment? 
when people focus their attention on themselves, they are 
in a state of self-awareness. Expanding from this theory 
focusing on states, Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975) 
proposed that individuals differ in their tendency to 
direct attention inward, and labeled this disposition to 
attend to oneself as self-consciousness. These authors 
constructed a scale assessing individual differences in 
self-consciousness, and factor analyses revealed three 
separate components of this construct, private and public 
self-consciousness, and a third factor labeled social 
anxiety.
Private self-consciousness concerns attention to 
one's own personal thoughts and feelings. Two sample 
items from the private self-consciousness subscale are "I 
reflect about myself a lot" and "I am generally attentive 
to my inner feelings." High private self-conscious 
persons are more aware of their feelings, beliefs, 
attitudes and predispositions than are lows. Public self- 
consciousness, on the other hand, concerns awareness of
3oneself as a social object. Items on this subscale 
include "I'm concerned about my style of doing things" and 
"I'm concerned about the way I present myself." Persons 
high in public self-consciousness are concerned with their 
social appearance and the impression they give to others. 
Social anxiety refers to a discomfort in the presence of 
others, and presumably results from a negative evaluation 
of oneself in the eyes of others. Private self- 
consciousness, public self-consciousness, and social 
anxiety are theoretically distinct constructs, and have 
been shown to be relatively independent empirically, as 
the correlations among the subscales have been found to be 
invariably low (e.g., Carver & Glass, 1976; Fenigstein et 
al., 1975). Investigating the reliability of the three 
subscales, Fenigstein et al. found test-retest 
correlations of .84, .79, and .73 for public self- 
consciousness, private self-consciousness, and social 
anxiety, respectively. Considerable discriminant and 
convergent validity has also been established for each 
subscale (Carver & Glass, 1976; Turner, Scheier, Carver & 
Ickes, 1978).
Whereas self-awareness refers to a state, self- 
consciousness refers to the disposition to be self- 
attentive. In essence, the two concepts refer to the same 
psychological state. The higher individuals are in 
private or public self-consciousness, the more frequently
4they engage in self-reflection by focusing on their inner 
selves or on the public aspects of themselves, 
respectively (Buss, 1980). As self-awareness and self- 
consciousness have received an increasing amount of 
attention among researchers in recent years, evidence 
indicating parallel effects for manipulated and 
dispositional self-attention and divergent behavioral 
consequences of public and private self-focus has been 
built up (see e.g. Carver & Scheier, 1981; Scheier & 
.Carver, 1981).
By definition, high private self-conscious 
individuals are very cognizant of their private selves, 
i.e., their emotions, values, predispositions and the 
like. Private self-consciousness has been found to be 
associated with personal rather than social aspects of 
identity, as high private self-conscious individuals 
endorse items such as "my emotions and feelings” and "my 
future goals and aspirations" as important to their sense 
of who they are (Cheek & Briggs, 1982). A growing amount 
of research literature suggests that individuals high in 
private self-consciousness both possess more extensive and 
accessible self-knowledge and are more accurate in their 
self-reports than those low in private self-consciousness.
Researchers investigating the greater self-knowledge 
of high private self-conscious persons have often based 
their studies on the notion of self-schemata, defined as
5"cognitive generalizations about the selfr derived from 
past experience, that organize and guide the processing of 
self-related information contained in the individual's 
social experiences" (Markus, 1977, p. 64). Elaborate, 
well articulated self-schemata should lead to more 
complete self-descriptions and be more easily accessed 
than poorly articulated ones. The accessibility of self­
schemata in high private self-conscious persons has been 
demonstrated in several studies. For example, high 
private self-conscious individuals, as compared to lows, 
named more self-descriptive adjectives when asked to 
describe themselves (Franzoi, 1983; Turner, 1978a).
Turner (1978b) also found that high private self-conscious 
persons were faster in judging whether unfavorable trait 
labels were descriptive of them or not. They also showed 
greater recall of trait, but not nontrait, words in a 
surprise recall task, presumably because they made more 
spontaneous decisions of self-reference of trait words 
(Turner, 1980).
The self-knowledge of high private self-conscious 
individuals is also reflected in the accuracy of their 
self-reports. In one study (Scheier, Buss & Buss, 1978), 
subjects who had earlier completed a self-report measure 
of aggressiveness took part in what was ostensibly 
potrayed as a learning experiment. They were given the 
opportunity to deliver shocks to another person in order
6to punish the person for mistakes in a concept formation 
task. It was hypothesized that the correspondence between 
self-reported aggressiveness and the aggression exhibited 
in the laboratory situation would be higher for 
individuals high in private self-consciousness than for 
those low in it. The results provided clear support for 
this? the correlation between the subjects* self-reports 
and actual behavior was .66 for the high private self- 
conscious subjects but only .09 for the lows.
Another experiment investigated the relationship 
between self-reports and dominance behaviors (Turner, 
1978c). Subjectjs first described their dominance behavior 
in two ways. They were given a hypothetical group 
participation situation and wrote one story describing 
their typical behavior in such a situation, and another 
story describing their behavior were they to act as 
dominantly as they could. They later participated in an 
experiment that ostensibly investigated problem solving in 
groups. Each subject participated in two sessions, both 
times with two confederates, and the group task was to 
solve an ambiguous real-life problem. In the first 
session, no instructions regarding dominance were 
provided? in the second session, the subjects were told to 
try to be a leader of the group and act as dominant as 
possible. Both sessions were tape recorded, and the 
subjects* levels of dominant behavior were assessed by the
7proportion of the discussion period they had been talking 
and by the confederates' ratings of the subjects' 
dominance. Again, the correlations between the earlier 
self-reports and the actual behavior were significantly 
higher for the high private self-conscious subjects than 
for the lows both in terms of their typical (.27 versus 
.13) and their maximal (.67 versus .33) dominance.
The accuracy of high private self-conscious persons 
self-reports was also supported by Franzoi (1983), who 
studied the self-concept differences of high and low 
private self-conscious individuals who were also high or 
low in social anxiety. His subjects were given the 
Adjective Check List (Gough & Heilbrun, 1965) and asked to 
check the adjectives that they felt were descriptive of 
them. They were then asked to give the list to a friend 
who was to evaluate them independently. The results 
indicated that when the subjects' self-ratings were 
compared to their friends' ratings of them, high private 
self-conscious subjects evaluated themselves more in line 
with their friends' evaluations than did lows. For the 
low private self-conscious subjects, the discrepancy 
between their self-ratings and the ratings of their 
friends was such that those who were high in social 
anxiety rated themselves more negatively and those low in 
social anxiety tended to rate themselves more positively 
than their friends rated them.
8Whether the results obtained by Franzoi (1983) were 
actually due to more accurate and articulated self- 
knowledge of the high private self-conscious subjects or 
to their friends' greater knowledge of them is a question 
that can be raised. In fact/ private self-consciousness 
has been shown to be associated with increased self- 
disclosure to friends (Franzoi & Davisf 1985). This 
suggests that the correspondence between subjects' self- 
descriptions and their friends' evaluations of them may 
have been due to better acquaintance rather than to 
greater or more accurate self-knowledge of the high 
private self-conscious subjects. Several points 
concerning this issue can be raised/ however. First/ 
Franzoi found no differences in the degree to which the 
subjects' friends rated how well they were acquainted with 
the subjects. Second/ although private self-consciousness 
has been found to be related to intimate self-disclosure 
and, through that self-disclosure/ to relationship 
satisfaction (Franzoi, Davis & Young, 1985), the reasoning 
underlying this relationship is that the greater self­
disclosure of the high private self-conscious individuals 
itself stems from their more detailed self-knowledge. In 
other words, their awareness of their private self- 
aspects, and the importance of those aspects to their 
self-concept, is proposed to predispose them to engage in 
intimate self-disclosure. Third, the accuracy of the high
9private self-conscious persons' self-reports is not only 
reflected in their being in line with friends' 
evaluations* In one study, outside observers with no 
previous exposure to individuals participating in a 
videotaped group interaction were better able to identify 
the self-descriptions of high than low private self- 
conscious individuals as descriptive of them (Bernstein & 
Davis, 1982).
Finally, several other studies indicate that high 
private self-conscious individuals may be better in touch 
with their internal states than lows. They have been 
shown to be more responsive to their emotions, which 
appears to be due to their greater awareness of their 
affective experiences rather than greater emotionality 
(Scheier, 1976; Scheier & Carver, 1977). They have also 
been found to be less suggestible than low private self- 
conscious persons as evidenced by their more accurate 
rating of the intensity of solutions consisting of 
peppermint extract and water (Scheier, Carver & Gibbons, 
1979).
If we accept that private self-consciousness is 
associated with well articulated and accurate self- 
knowledge, how might it be related to the perception of 
others? Previous studies have focused on the self- 
perception of private self-conscious individuals and the 
behavioral consequences of the awareness of one's private
10
self-aspects, while neglecting the possible effects of 
private self-consciousness on such interpersonal processes 
as perspective-taking. Because private self- 
consciousness refers to attention directed to the private 
aspects of the self, one could argue that persons high in 
this disposition should attend less closely to the verbal 
and nonverbal cues of others and consequently be less able 
to take another person's perspective. However, Rogers' 
(1951, 1959) argument that the ability to process 
information about personal experience is related to 
empathic understanding suggests that high private self- 
conscious individuals are better able to "take the 
internal frame of reference of another with accuracy" 
(Rogers, 1959, p. 210). According to Rogers, a person 
comes to perceive others more realistically and 
accurately, being able to understand them from their own 
point of view, as a consequence of decreased defensiveness 
and increased openness to and acceptance of his or her own 
experiences. In other words, the more readily people 
assimilate their own experiences, the less defensive they 
are, and the more aware they are of which behaviors and 
experiences are theirs and which belong to others. Rogers 
sees self-knowledge accompanied by self-acceptance as an 
important determinant of empathic ability.
It is important to note that Rogers (1951, 1959) also 
puts emphasis on self-acceptance. Considering the concept
11
of self-consciousness, it is conceivable that some people 
score high on the private subscale by agreeing to such 
statements as "I'm always trying to figure myself out" and 
"I'm alert to changes in my mood," and have negative views 
of themselves. Awareness of one's inner experiences does 
not necessarily imply self-acceptance and lack of 
defensiveness. In fact, private self-consciousness has 
been found to have a low but significant negative 
correlation with self-esteem (Turner et al., 1978). Thus, 
one could separate high private self-conscious persons 
into those who engage in self-reflection in a way of self- 
criticism, and those who do so with acceptance of one's 
self and experience. If both awareness of one's own 
experiences and self-acceptance are necessary for accurate 
understanding of others, high private self-conscious 
individuals with relatively high self-esteem, as compared 
to those low in private self-consciousness or high in 
private self-consciousness but posessing low self-esteem, 
should be best able to take the perspective of another 
person.
Although no research has been done to test this 
hypothesis directly, there are some findings suggesting 
that self-consciousness and self-esteem may be relevant to 
perspective-taking. For example, Davis (1983) found that 
self-esteem was related to the self-reported tendency to 
adopt the poit of view of another person as measured by
12
the Perspective Taking subscale of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980). A study bearing some 
relevance to self-consciousness and perspective taking was 
done by Stephenson and Wicklund (1984). They found that 
high private self-conscious subjects made fewer 
perspective taking errors than did lows in a very concrete 
perspective taking task where subjects gave instructions 
directing a confederate to go through a maze with his 
finger. The subjects were seated opposite to the 
confederate, and were consequently required to consider a 
different spatial perspective from their own in giving the 
directions.
A study by Alcorn and Torney (1982) relates to the 
possible effect of private self-consciousness on empathic 
understanding, defined in their study as the ability to 
identify others' emotions. The subjects in the study were 
experienced counselors who provided self-reports of 
experiences of emotional states such as anger, depression, 
and happiness. These reports were then scored for 
complexity according to the number of different aspects 
used in describing the experiences. The subjects also 
listened to audiotaped statements expressing emotions, and 
chose descriptive words for the expressed emotions from a 
word list. The responses were compared to those of a 
panel of judges consisting of five psychiatrists and a 
clinical psychologist in order to arrive at a score for
13
accurate empathic understanding for each individual. 
Controlling for the effects of verbal ability, a 
significant positive correlation (.48) was found between 
subjects' complexity in describing their experiences of 
various emotional states and their ability to identify 
accurately the emotions expressed in the audiotaped 
statements. The authors concluded that these findings 
indicate that counselors' levels of emotional awareness 
are related to their ability to understand the emotional 
communication of others. Because high private self- 
conscious individuals appear to be more cognizant of and 
responsive to their experiences and dispositions than 
lows, it is expected that they are better able to identify 
the experiences of others.
Cognitive perspective-taking or role-taking falls 
under the construct of empathy, but is only one of the 
ways empathy has been defined in the past (see Chlopan, 
McCain, Carbonell & Hagen, 1985; Davis, 1980, 1983? 
Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Gladstein, 1983). In a broad 
sense, empathy refers to the sensitivity to others' 
experiences. Recently, attempts have been made to define 
empathy as a multidimensional construct or a set of 
constructs (e.g., Davis, 1980, 1983). Two major types of 
empathy have been traditionally identified: cognitive
empathy or perspective-taking, referring to the ability to 
identify the psychological perspective of another person
14
(e.g., Dymond, 1949? Hogan, 1969), and affective empathy, 
referring to an emotional reaction or the tendency to 
vicariously experience the feelings of others (e.g., 
Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972).
Researchers investigating cognitive perspective- 
taking have often asked subjects to predict stimulus 
persons* self-descriptions on a variety of scales. As 
argued by authors such as Cronbach (1955), and later by 
Cline (1964), such measures of empathy have several 
shortcomings. For one, the accuracy scores from such 
tasks may actually reflect assumed similarity on the part 
of the judges. Judges who happen to be similar to the 
stimulus person(s) can achieve high accuracy scores just 
by projecting their own characteristics onto the stimulus 
person(s). Such accuracy scores hardly reflect any "true" 
perspective-taking ability.
Cronbach (1955) also differentiated four components 
(elevation, differential elevation, stereotype accuracy, 
and differential accuracy) of the accuracy score. The 
elevation component reflects a response bias or artifact 
in that it refers to the tendency of a judge to use the 
same part of the rating scale as the stimulus persons.
The differential elevation component refers to a judge's 
ability to rank order the mean self-ratings of the 
stimulus persons across all traits. Stereotype accuracy 
refers to a judge's ability to rank order traits averaged
15
across the stimulus persons and concerns the accuracy of a 
judge's stereotype of the stimulus group as a whole. The 
last componentf differential accuracy, is the one that 
comes the closest to any "true" accuracy, referring to a 
judge's ability to predict differences among the stimulus 
persons on each trait separately. Thus, earlier research 
that failed to take into account the complexity of the 
accuracy scores is often regarded to be ambiguous at best 
(see Hastorf, Schneider, & Polefka, 1970; Tagiuri, 1969).
Recently, Bernstein and Davis (1982) attempted to 
develop a technique that yielded accuracy scores that were 
relatively free of the artifacts pointed out by Cronbach 
(1955). They designed a forced choice method where 
subjects viewed a group of people interacting and were 
provided with short self-descriptions of each individual 
appearing on the tape. The subjects' task was to match the 
self-descriptions with the correct individuals, and their 
accuracy scores were determined by the number of correct 
matches they made. This procedure was intended to 
eliminate the bias of projection or assumed similarity, 
since the targets and the self-descriptions were provided 
for the judges, and the judges were not asked to make 
ratings on scales also endorsed by the targets. For the 
same reason, the procedure minimized artifact of 
elevation, i.e., similarity between subject and target in 
endorsing a certain range of scores on a scale. Thus, the
16
task of matching targets with their self-descriptions 
depended primarily on judges* ability to detect 
differences among the targets, which is what the 
differential accuracy component has been proposed to 
measure and has been considered "true" accuracy.
Constructing several target tapes, Bernstein and 
Davis (1982) found that their technique resulted in 
accuracy scores that were better than chance guessing, and 
that individuals scoring high on perspective-taking as 
measured by one of the subscales of Davis (1980) 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index were best able to match 
target subjects with their self-descriptions. The present 
study employed the same technique in assessing the 
relationship between self-consciousness, self-esteem, and 
perspective-taking. It was hypothesized that high 
private self-conscious individuals with high self-esteem 
would be best able to take the perspective of others by 
matching self-descriptions to correct target individuals 
after watching a videotaped group interaction. No 
differences were expected between high private self- 
conscious individuals with low self-esteem and low private 
self-conscious individuals with either low or high self­
esteem.
17
Method
Instrument
Target persons who appeared in the videotapes 
constructed for the present study were recruited from 
upper-level undergraduate psychology courses at the 
College of William and Mary. The investigator explained 
to female students that several volunteers were needed to 
participate in videotaped group discussions that would 
later be used in the investigator's Master's research 
among female introductory students. The Self- 
Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al.r 1975) was 
distributed to a total of 65 upper-class females who were 
willing to be contacted later for possible participation. 
Prospective target persons were selected on the basis of 
their scores on the Private and Public subscales of the 
Self-Consciousness Scale. Of approximately 20 females who 
were contacted, 10 agreed to participate in the 
construction of two videotapes. Four of the females 
scored in the upper 30th percentile and four in the lower 
30th percentile on the Private subscale. Two of the High 
Private targets and two of the Low Private targets also 
scored in the upper 30th percentile on the Public 
subscale, and the other half of each group scored in the 
lower 30th percentile on the Public subscale.
18
Additionally, two target persons who scored close to the 
median on both subscales were recruited. Thus, two groups 
of five target females were formed; in both groups, each 
one of the following types of targets was represented:
High Private/High Public, High Private/Low Public, Low 
Private/High Public, Low Private/Low Public, and Medium 
Private/Medium Public.
The selection of the targets according to their self- 
consciousness scores was conducted for two reasons.
First, in their study using a matching task similar to the 
present one, Bernstein and Davis (1982, study 2) found 
that targets' level of self-consciousness influenced the 
observer subjects' ability to match the self-descriptions 
with the targets. More specifically, it was found that 
High Private targets were significantly more easily 
matched with their self-descriptions that Low Privates, 
and that Public self-consciousness also had an effect on 
the observers' matching accuracy such that targets low in 
public self-consciousness were more easily matched with 
their self-descriptions than were those high in it.
Second, because the effect of private self-consciousness 
on perspective-taking was one of the main variables of 
interest in the present study, the selection of targets 
based on their levels of private self-consciousness was 
seen as also serving the purpose of keeping any possible 
effects of real similarity between observer subjects and
19
the targets constant for both tapes.
The two target videotapes were constructed using a
method similar to that of Bernstein and Davis (1982). The
two target groups were videotaped separately, and the
procedure used with each group was the same. The five
target persons in each group gave their written consent to
being videotaped in a group discussion, and filled out the
following self-description questionnaire:
Please write a short (about one or two 
paragraphs) description of yourself as you 
see yourself. That is, write a "personality 
sketch" of yourself. Try to focus on 
characteristics that are predominant in 
the way you see yourself as a person. Please 
do not include any physical characteristics.
This self-description questionnaire was different 
from the one used by Bernstein and Davis (1982). In their 
study, each target subject was asked to write down three 
words that were descriptive of her and could be easily 
identified by others as being a description of her (as 
here, their subjects were asked not to include physical 
characteristics). The purpose of the present study was to 
have the target subjects describe themselves as they saw 
themselves (with no consideration of how others might view 
them), so that the observer subjects' ability to take each 
target person's self-perspective would not be confounded 
by 1) how accurate the target subject was in describing 
how she appears to others, and 2) how similar the 
observers were to that generalized "other" in their view
20
of each target. Also, in the present study the target 
subjects were asked to write a free-form self-description 
rather than single words or adjectives. This was done to 
avoid possible artificiality of descriptions containing 
single words and to allow for greater personal depth in 
the self-descriptions.
After the self-descriptions were completed and 
collected, the target subjects were taken into a studio 
and seated in a semicircle facing a videocamera. A 
microphone was placed in front outside of the camera's 
view but so that all the target subjects' voices could be 
recorded clearly. The target subjects then completed 
another questionnaire before the group discussion took 
place. The questionnaire asked each target to imagine 
being stranded alone on a tropical island and to choose 
four items she would bring with her to the island. After 
the island questionnaires were completed, the topic of the 
group discussion was introduced in a manner identical to 
that of Bernstein and Davis (1982). The target subjects 
were asked to imagine that they were stranded on the 
island together, and to choose six items they would take 
with them as a group. Four of those items were to come, 
in any way the targets wished, from the five individual 
lists, and the other two items were additional ones that 
the group was to come up with during the discussion. The 
group started the discussion by having each target read
21
off the items on her own list. The investigator then left 
the room, and the videotaping of the group discussion was 
monitored from the the control room adjacent to the 
studio. The first target group completed the group 
discussion in 11.40 minutes (Tape A) and the second group 
completed it in 15.25 minutes (Tape B).
After the completion of the group discussion, the 
investigator explained the general purpose of the self­
descriptions and the videotapes to the groups. In order 
to assure as much confidentiality as possible, the target 
subjects were told that their names would not be used in 
connection with the showing of the tapes in subsequent 
research, and that their self-descriptions would remain 
anonymous and unconnected to the correct individuals on 
the tapes. No target subjects in either group wished to 
withdraw the use of the tape or their self-descriptions. 
The target subjects were then thanked for their 
participation and dismissed.
In a pilot study designed to test for the equivalence 
of the two target tapes, 66 female undergraduates enrolled 
in introductory psychology classes at the College of 
William and Mary were shown both tapes. After viewing one 
tape, the observer subjects matched the five self­
descriptions that belonged to that particular target group 
with the correct individuals. The procedure was then 
repeated for the other tape. The order of the tape
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presentation was randomized across groups. In each 
matching taskr the subjects also indicated whether they 
knew any of the target females and if so, whom. Each 
observer subject received two summed accuracy scores, one 
for Tape A and one for Tape B. The scores for each tape 
ranged from 0 to 5, because for any one tape, a subject 
could make 0, 1, 2, 3 or 5 correct matches.
The number of targets the subjects knew on Tape A 
correlated with the subjects* matching performance on that 
tape (p (64) = .55, p < .001), but there was no 
correlation between knowledge of the targets and 
performance on Tape B (jr (64) = -.02, n.s.). The 
subjects' matching accuracy scores were then submitted to 
a 2 (Order of tape presentation) X 2 (Tape) analysis of 
variance with repeated measures on the second factor, 
using knowledge of the targets as a covariate. This 
analysis indicated that knowledge of the targets on Tape A 
appeared as a significant covariate in the overall 
analysis of covariance, but it had little influence on the 
significance levels or the means. The covariate was 
consequently excluded from further analyses. Subsequent 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of Tape (F (1, 
64) = 6.87, p < .02), such that subjects were more 
accurate in matching the self-descriptions with the 
targets on Tape B (M = 1.82) than on Tape A (M = 1.35).
The interaction between Order and Tape was also
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significant, F (1, 64) = 13.48, p < .01. Inspection of 
the means indicated that the difference between the 
accuracy scores for Tape A and Tape B was greater when 
Tape A was seen first (means .89 and 2.11, respectively) 
than when Tape B was seen first (means 1.68 and 1.61, 
respectively). This suggested a practice effect, and it 
appeared that the difficulty of matching the self­
descriptions with the targets in Tape A was somewhat 
alleviated when Tape B was shown first. Table 1 shows the 
mean accuracy scores for Tapes A and B according to the 
order of presentation. *
Insert Table 1 about here
Because the analysis failed to demonstrate 
equivalence for the two tapes and no correlation was found 
between the two accuracy scores (r_ (64) = .06, n.s.), it 
was decided that only Tape B would be used in further 
study. To investigate whether convergence could be 
demonstated between matching free-form self-descriptions 
and matching self-descriptive adjectives with the correct 
individuals, the target subjects were called in to fill 
out an additional questionnaire approximately a month 
after the construction of the videotapes. The 
instructions for the additional questionnaire reads
Think of five to ten words that describe you.
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That is, write down five to ten adjectives 
that you think are descriptive of you as a 
person. Do not include any physical 
characteristics.
Although this form of self-descriptions was closer to 
that used by Bernstein and Davis (1982), there were still 
two differences. In the present study, target subjects 
wrote down five to ten self-descriptive words rather than 
three, and they described themselves as they saw 
themselves rather than in a way that other people would 
recognize as descriptive of them.
Subjects
Subjects were 61 female undergraduates enrolled in 
the introductory psychology classes at the College of 
William and Mary who received credit for their 
participation. The subjects were recruited based on their 
earlier completion of the Self-Consciousness Scale 
(Fenigstein et al., 1975) and the Rosenberg (1965) Self- 
Esteem Scale as these scales were administered to the 
departmental subject pool in a masstest administration.
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale was chosen because it is 
proposed to measure a more global or overall privately 
experienced self-evaluation rather than situationally 
fluctuating self-attitude and has been widely used in the 
past (cf. Demo, 1985). In the final sample of 61 
subjects, scores on the Private Self-Consciousness 
subscale ranged from 17 to 38, with a median of 25 (M = 
25.95), and scores on the Self-Esteem Scale ranged from 1
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to 6, with a median of 5 (M = 4.49). Subjects were 
identified as high in private self-consciousness if they 
scored above the median on the Private Self-Consciousness 
subscale, and low if they scored on or below the median. 
Subjects whose scores on the Self-esteem Scale were on or 
above the median were identified as high self-esteem 
subjects? those scoring below the median were identified 
as having a low self-esteem.
Procedure
The subjects were run in groups of four to 12 
individuals and were seated in a classroom in front of a 
TV monitor on which the target videotape (Tape B) was 
shown. The subjects were told that they would be asked to 
watch a videotaped group discussion and asked to respond 
to some questions concerning it. They then read and 
signed a consent form, and completed the Perspective- 
Taking subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(Davis, 1980), a seven item scale that measures the self- 
reported tendency or ability to take the point of view of 
other people. This measure was included to test for the 
convergence between subjects’ performance on the matching 
tasks and their self-reported perspective-taking ability.
After the completion and collection of the consent 
forms and the Perspective-Taking subscale, the subjects 
were explained their task in greater detail. They were 
told that they would be watching a videotape of five
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females deciding on six items to take to a deserted 
island. The subjects were also told that prior to the 
videotaped discussion each female had written a short 
description of herself and later provided five to ten 
adjectives that she thought were descriptive of her. The 
instructions given to the target females regarding the 
free-form self-descriptions were read to the subjects.
The subjects were then told that they would be given both 
the free-form self-descriptions and the self-descriptive 
adjective lists separately after they had seen the 
videotape, and asked to match them with the correct 
individuals.
The subjects were then explained the instructions 
given to the target females concerning the group 
discussion task, and the videotape was turned on. At the 
end of the group discussion, the tape was stopped but the 
image of the target group was kept frozen on the screen to 
help the subjects in their task. The subjects were given 
two questionnaires, one with the free-form self­
descriptions and one with the self-descriptive adjectives 
the target females had generated. The order of the 
questionnaires was randomized across sessions. On both 
questionnaires, five lines corresponding to the seating 
positions of the five target females were printed on top 
of the self-descriptions. The instructions asked the 
subjects to match each self-description with the
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individual they thought wrote it by placing the number of 
the description on the line corresponding to the seating 
position of that female. The self-descriptions appeared 
in a random order and were numbered from 1 to 5. After 
each matching task, the subjects also rated how confident 
they were that they chose the right description for each 
of the target individuals. These ratings were made on a 
7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all confident) to 7 
(extremely confident). They also indicated whether they 
knew any of the females appearing on the tape, and if so, 
whom. After the completion of the tasks, the subjects 
were briefly explained the purpose of the study, thanked, 
and dismissed.
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Results
Two accuracy scores in perspective-taking were 
computed for each subject by summing the total number of 
correct matches she made on the free-form self-description 
matching task and on the adjective matching task. Thus, 
subjects received two scores ranging from 0 to 5. The 
number of females the subjects knew on the target tape did 
not correlate with their performance on the adjective 
matching task and had only a marginally significant 
correlation with their performance on the free-form 
matching task (r_ (59) = .17, p < .10). Preliminary 
analysis of the accuracy scores indicated that knowledge 
of the targets was not a significant covariate, and 
revealed no effects for the order of the two matching 
tasks. These two variables were thus excluded from 
further analyses.
A test of convergence between the two matching tasks 
was conducted by computing a correlation between the two 
accuracy scores. A nonsignificant correlation of r_ (59)
= .14 was obtained, indicating a lack of convergence 
between the two tasks. Subjects performed significantly 
better on the adjective matching task (M = 3.10) than on 
the free-form matching task (M = 1.79, t (60) = 5.39, p <
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.001, two-tailed)7 inspection of the distributions of the 
scores on the two tasks did not show any apparent 
anomalies, and the standard deviations were similar (1.32 
for the free-form matching and 1.57 for the adjective 
matching tasks). To test further for the convergent 
validity of the two tasks, each accuracy score was 
correlated with subjects' self-reported perspective-taking 
tendency, as measured by the Perspective Taking subscale 
of the Davis (1980) Interpersonal Reactivity Index. Self- 
reported perspective-taking was associated with subjects' 
performance on the free-form matching task (r_ (59) = .35, 
p < .005), but not with their performance on the adjective 
matching task (jc (59) = .02, n.s.). Thus, convergent 
validity was demonstrated only for the matching task using 
the free-form self-descriptions.
To test for the hypothesized effects of private self- 
consciousness and self-esteem on subjects' perspective- 
taking ability, each accuracy score was first analyzed 
with a 2 (private self-consciousness) X 2 (self-esteem) 
analysis of variance. Neither private self-consciousness 
nor self-esteem had a significant effect on the subjects' 
ability to match the free-form self-descriptions with the 
correct targets, and the interaction was also 
nonsignificant (all ps > .20). For the adjective matching 
accuracy, only a significant effect of self-esteem was 
revealed, (F (1, 57) = 7.49, p < .01), such that subjects
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with high self-esteem were more accurate in that task than 
those with low self-esteem (means 3.57 and 2.46, 
respectively). Correlational analyses also indicated that 
self-esteem was significantly related to subjects' 
accuracy scores on the adjective matching task (r. (59) = 
.33, p < .005) but not on the free-form matching task (p 
(59) = -.006, n.s.). Private self-consciousness did not 
correlate with subjects' performance on either the 
adjective matching task (r_ (59) = -.18, n.s.) or the free­
form matching task (p (59) = .06, n.s.). Table 2 shows 
the mean accuracy scores on each matching task for 
subjects high and low in private self-consciousness and 
high or low in self-esteem.
Insert Table 2 about here
Subjects' scores on the Perspective Taking subscale 
(Davis, 1980) were also analyzed in a 2 (private self- 
consciousness) X 2 (self-esteem) analysis of variance. 
Neither private self-consciousness nor self-esteem showed 
a significant effect, and the interaction was also 
nonsignificant (all ps > .10). Table 3 shows the mean 
self-reported perspective-taking scores for subjects high 
and low in private self-consciousness and high or low in 
self-esteem. However, although a nonsignificant 
correlation of p (59) = -.05 was found between self-esteem
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and self-reported perspective-taking tendency, private 
self-consciousness did have a low but significant 
correlation with self-reported perspective-taking (r. (59)
= .21, p < .03). In order to check whether private self- 
consciousness and self-esteem had an effect on subjects' 
performance on either or both of the matching tasks after 
holding self-reported perspective-taking constant, two 2 
(private self-consciousness) X 2 (self-esteem) analyses of 
covariance were conducted on subjects' accuracy scores on 
the free-form and the adjective matching tasks, using 
self-reported perspective-taking as a covariate. These 
analyses did not change the results reported above.
Insert Table 3 about here
Although the analyses of variance performed on 
subjects' total accuracy scores failed to show the 
hypothesized effects, revealing only a main effect of 
self-esteem on the adjective matching task, it is possible 
that private self-consciousness and self-esteem have 
differential effects on subjects' ability to take the 
pespective of another person depending on who that other 
person is. In other words, how able different types of 
subjects were to match a self-description with its author 
may be in part a function of the type of a target person. 
Recall that the target individuals were recruited on the
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basis of their levels of private and public self- 
consciousness. To investigate this possibility, an 
additional 2 (private self-consciousness) X 2 (self- 
esteem) X 5 (target) analysis of variance with repeated 
measures on the last factor was conducted on both the 
free-form and the adjective matching tasks. On the free­
form matching task, only a significant main effect of 
target was found, F (4, 228) = 4.40, p < .003. No other 
main effects nor the interactions were significant.
Further analysis indicated that subjects were 
significantly better able to match the correct free-form 
self-descriptions with the High Private/Low Public and the 
Low Private/High Public targets (M = .48) than with the 
other three targets (i.e., the High Private/High Public, 
Low Private/Low Public, and Medium Private/Medium Public 
targets, M = .27), F (1,57) = 12.57, p < .002. On the 
adjective matching task, no significant effects involving 
the type of a target were found, and the only significant 
effect that was revealed was the main effect of self­
esteem, F (1, 57) = 7.49, p < .01. Table 4 presents 
subjects' mean target-specific accuracy scores on the 
free-form and the adjective matching tasks.
Insert Table 4 about here
Finally, did subjects* subjective estimates of their
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performance on the two matching tasks correspond to their 
actual performance on those tasks? As indicated before, 
subjects rated how confident they were that they chose the 
correct self-description for each given target individual 
after each of the two matching tasks. For each matching 
task, the five confidence ratings were averaged for each 
subject to get an index of overall confidence. 
Correlational analyses revealed a nonsignificant 
relationship both between subjects' actual performance on 
the free-form matching task and their overall confidence 
in their performance on it (z_ (59) * .14, n.s.), and 
between their actual performance on the adjective matching 
task and their overall confidence in their performance on 
it (r_ (59) = .09, n.s.). It thus appeared that subjects 
were not very good at estimating how well they could match 
the self-descriptions with the targets.
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Discussion
The results failed to support the hypothesis that 
high private self-conscious individuals with relatively 
high self-esteem are better able to take the perspective 
of others than individuals with any other combination of 
private self-consciousness and self-esteem. It appears 
that the combination of being attentive to one's inner 
experiences (such as emotions, values, and dispositional 
tendencies) and being accepting of oneself may not be a 
necessary precondition of accurate understanding of 
others' experiences or perspectives. Another possibility 
is that both high private self-consciousness and high 
self-esteem are necessary, but not sufficient, factors in 
perspective-taking ability. The present study did not 
look at any other individual difference variables, such as 
cognitive complexity or intelligence, that may also play 
an important role, possibly in combination with private 
self-consciousness and self-esteem, in the ability to 
understand others from their own points of view.
Private self-consciousness had no effect on 
subjects' perspective-taking ability, as it was 
operationalized in the two behavioral tasks in the present 
study. One possibility for this lack of relationship is
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that any benefit private self-consciousness may have on 
the accurate perception of others and their viewpoints is 
attenuated by the consequent lesser attention paid to 
environmental stimuli as one habitually directs attention 
inward. Interestingly, however, private self- 
consciousness was positively related to self-reported 
perspective-taking, which in turn was associated with 
subjects* accuracy on the free-form self-description 
matching task. Yet the relationship between private self- 
consciousness and self-reported perspective-taking and the 
relationship between self-reported perspective-taking and 
free-form matching accuracy appeared to be independent, 
which also suggests that a more complex model, taking 
other factors into account, may be needed to explain 
individual differences in perspective-taking ability. 
Another possible explanation for this finding is that the 
two self-report measures, namely private self- 
consciousness and perspective-taking, shared some variance 
due to a response bias.
The way perspective-taking was operationalized in 
the present study may also be problematic. The lack of 
convergence between performances on the two tapes that 
were initially developed, and the lack of convergence 
between the two matching tasks associated with the same 
tape and target individuals is discouraging. Decision as 
to which of the two tasks is more valid in measuring
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perspective-taking ability cannot readily be made from the 
present data; further validation of both tasks is needed. 
Nevertheless, the finding that self-reported perspective- 
taking was related to subjects' performance on the free­
form matching task, but was unrelated to their performance 
on the adjective matching task, suggests that the former 
task may be more valid and more sensitive to perspective- 
taking ability.
Overall, the adjective matching task was relatively 
easy for the subjects, evidenced by the significantly 
higher accuracy scores on that task. Yet it was only on 
this easier task that self-esteem revealed a significant 
effect, high self-esteem subjects performing better on the 
task than lows. According to Davis' (1983) reasoning, 
perspective-taking and self-esteem are positively related 
because both should be associated with better social 
functioning. It may be that perspective-taking ability 
leads to smoother social relationships (cf. Franzoi & 
Davis, 1985), which, in turn, results in greater 
relationship satisfaction and more opportunity for 
positive feedback and thus higher self-esteem. On the 
other hand, theorists such as Rogers (1951, 1959) tend to 
see self-acceptance or self-esteem as a necessary, 
although not sufficient, precondition for empathic 
ability. Berkowitz (1972), in turn, has argued that 
responsiveness to others is inhibited by personal
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concerns. Aside from the problem that no evidence of 
convergent validity was found for the adjective matching 
taskr the present results suggest that high self-esteem 
may have a beneficial effect on perspective-taking in 
situations where it is relatively easy to identify the 
viewpoints of others, but lose its advantage as the task 
gets harder. Why this would happen is a question that 
heeds to be addressed in further research.
The finding that matching the adjective lists was an 
easier task than matching the free-form self-descriptions 
with the correct targets was somewhat surprising. After 
all, free-form self-descriptions should allow for more 
personal style and depth than merely listing self- 
descriptive adjectivesf and thus make discriminations 
among individuals easier. It is possible/ however/ that 
the stylistic differences allowed in the free-form self­
descriptions may actually divert the readers' attention 
from the core content, whereas in the adjective lists the 
substance of the authors' self-views is more readily 
available and explicitly stated. In our daily lives, we 
rarely encounter situations where such explicit, to-the- 
point statements about personal views and self-conceptions 
are made; rather, we are usually presented with broader 
and more complex information. It appears that it is those 
more realistic situations where perspective-takers excell 
in their ability to identify the viewpoints and
38
experiences of others. One interesting finding in the
present study was that, unlike the adjective matching 
task, the free-form self-description matching task was 
both related to self-reported perspective-taking and 
sensitive to differences among the target individuals. In 
their study, Bernstein and Davis (1982) found that high 
private self-conscious target individuals were more easily 
matched with their self-descriptions than were lows, which 
fits in nicely with the findings that private self- 
consciousness is associated with more articulated self- 
knowledge and more valid self-reports (e.g., Franzoi,
1983? Scheier, Buss & Buss, 1978), and that targets' 
public self-consciousness tended to have the opposite 
effect. The results of the present study, however, differ 
from the findings of Bernstein and Davis. In the present 
study, subjects were better able to match a free-form 
self-description with the correct target individual not 
only when the target individual was high in private and 
low in public self-consciousness, but also when the the 
target was a low private/high public self-conscious 
person. Why was this the case? Although the present data 
do not lend themselves to any firm conclusions concerning 
this finding, one plausable explanation can be offered.
The low private/high public self-conscious individual 
appearing on the videotape was the only one in her group 
who indicated in her free-form self-description that her
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religious beliefs were very important to her; she was also 
the only one who read off "the Bible" as one of the items 
she had written down to take to a deserted island at the 
beginning of the videotape. It seems very likely that the 
observer subjects were consequently able to connect her to 
her self-description just by remembering that specific 
piece of information. This possibility indicates that the 
quality of the matching task associated with this method 
of operationalizing perspective-taking can be extremely 
sensitive to small but unique details that may come up in 
targets' self-descriptions and their choice of items in 
the group discussion task.
Recently, Swann (1984) made an interesting point 
concerning accuracy in person perception. He 
differentiated between global accuracy and circumscribed 
accuracy. Global accuracy refers to a perceiver's ability 
to predict a target's behavior in the presence of all 
individuals, across all situations or contexts, and over a 
long period of time. Circumscribed accuracy, on the other 
hand, refers to the perceiver's ability to predict the 
target's behavior in the presence of the perceiver, within 
a relatively limited number of contexts, and for shorter 
periods of time. Swann argued that researchers have 
generally attempted to measure global accuracy by moving 
the perceivers and the person perception process from the 
interpersonal context to a laboratory, and having the
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perceivers identify targets* overall dispositions. 
According to Swann, this type of research ignores the 
interpersonal processes and the perceivers* and targets* 
goals in social interactions. He proposed that roost often 
individuals are concerned with circumscribed accuracy, 
and, in fact, achieving global accuracy may be close to an 
impossible task as individuals tend to adjust their 
behaviors according to situational demands. Thus, for 
everyday perceivers, circumscribed accuracy is the type of 
accuracy that they desire and pursue.
Researchers* concern with only global accuracy may 
have led them to infer lower levels of accuracy than 
perceivers actually have, according to Swann (1984). 
Following the past research, the present study also 
focused on global accuracy only; more specifically, the 
present study concerned the ability to accurately match 
general self-descriptions of dispositions with the correct 
individuals. That form of accuracy is not argued to be 
unimportant, however. In fact, it is often the goal of 
professional perceivers such as clinicians, as Swann 
pointed out. However, it may be important to also look at 
circumscribed accuracy, as it is usually the primary and 
salient concern in everyday interactions. Any further 
research on the effects of private self-consciousness and 
self-esteem on perspective-taking should consider the 
possibility that while individual differences in those
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dispositions may not be strongly related to forms of 
global accuracy, studying their effects on circumscribed 
accuracy may prove to be a more fruitful approach.
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Table 1
Subjects* Mean Accuracy Scores for Tapes A and B 
According to the Order of Presentation (Pretest)
A
Tape
B
Order
A First M .89 2.11
SD .83 1.45
n 28 28
B First
*
M 1.68 1.61
SD 1.54 1.24
n 38 38
Note. Higher numbers indicate higher matching accuracy.
Each subject performed both matching tasks (Tape A
and Tape B).
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Table 2
Mean Accuracy Scores for High and Low Private Self- 
Conscious Subjects with High or Low Self-Esteem
Matching Task 
Free-Form Adjective Lists
Self-Descriptions
Self-Esteem
Low High Total Low High Total
Private Low M 1.67 1.55 1.59 2.50 3.95 3.41
Self- SD 1.37 1.23 1.27 1.57 1.23 1.52
Conscious­ n 12 20 32 12 20 32
ness
High M 1.86 2.13 2.00 2.43 3.07 2.76
SD 1.46 1.30 1.36 1.45 1.67 1.57
n 14 15 29 14 15 29
Total M 1.77 1.80 2.46 3.57
SD 1.39 1.28 1.48 1.48
n 26 35 26 35
Note. Each subject performed both matching tasks.
50
Table 3
Mean Self-Reported Perspective-Taking Scores for High 
and Low Private Self-Conscious Subjects with High or Low 
Self-Esteem
Self -Esteem
Low High
Private Low M 17.17 18.80 18.19
Self- SD 2.59 3.04 2.95
Conscious­ n 12 20 32
ness
High M 19.14 19.67 19.41
SD 3.39 4.08 3.71
n 14 15 29
M 18.23 19.17
SD 3.15 3.49
n 26 35
Note. The higher the score, the higher the self-reported 
perspective-taking tendency.
51
Table 4
Subjects* Mean Target-Specific Accuracy Scores on the 
Free-Form and the Adjective Matching Tasks
Matching Task 
Free-Form Adjective Lists 
Self-Descriptions
Target
High Private/ M .262 .656
High Public SD . 444 .479
High Private/ M .410 .640
Low Public SD . 496 .484
Low Private/ M .557 .656
High Public SD .501 .479
Low Private/ M .295 .623
Low Public SD .460 .489
Median Private/ H .262 .525
Median Public SD .444 .504
Note. All 61 subjects performed both matching tasks
and contribute to all these means. A score of 0 
signifies an inaccurate match and a score of 1 an 
accurate match.
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APPENDIX
The Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975)
Below are twenty-three statements that may or may not be 
characteristic of the way you see yourself as a person. 
Read each one carefully and rate whether the statement is 
characteristic or uncharacteristic of you using the rating 
scale below. Place the number of your answer on the 
appropriate line.
Extremely uncharacteristic of me = 0 
Generally uncharacteristic of me = 1 
Equally characteristic and 
uncharacteristic of me = 2
Generally characteristic of me = 3 
Extremely characteristic of me = 4
1. I'm always trying to figure myself out.
2. I'm concerned about my style of doing things.
3. Generally, I'm not very aware of myself.
_ 4. It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new 
situations.
5. I reflect about myself a lot.
6. I'm concerned about the way I present myself.
7. I'm often the subject of my own fantasies.
8. I have trouble working when someone is watching 
me.
9. I never scrutinize myself.
.10. I get embarrassed very easily.
11. I'm self-conscious about the way I look.
.12. I don't find it hard to talk to strangers.
*13. I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings.
.14. I usually worry about making a good impression.
15. I'm constantly examining my motives.
.16. I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group. 
*17. One of the last things I do before leaving my 
house is look in the mirror.
18. I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off 
somewhere watching myself.
19. I'm concerned about what other people think of me. 
.20. I'm alert to changes in my mood.
21. I'm usually aware of my appearance.
_22. I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work 
through a  problem.
23. Large groups make me nervous.
The Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965)
Please read each of the following statements carefully, 
and indicate how much you agree with each by using the 
following scales
1 * Strongly Agree
2 = Agree
3 = Disagree
4 = Strongly disagree
I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an 
equal plane with others.
All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a 
failure.
I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
I am able to do things as well as most other peopl
I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
I take a positive attitude towards myself.
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
I wish I could have more respect for myself.
I certainly feel useless at times.
At times I think I am no good at all.
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The Perspective-Taking Subscale (Davis, 1980)
Interpersonal Reactivity Index
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and 
feelings in a variety of situations. For each item, 
indicate how well it describes you by choosing the 
appropriate number on the scale at the top of this page; 
0, 1, 2, 3, or 4. When you have decided on your answer, 
fill in the number next to the item number. Read each 
item carefully before responding, and try to answer as 
honestly and accurately as you can.
Answer scale:
Does NOT 
describe 
me well
4
Describes 
me VERY 
well
1. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from 
the "other guy's" point of view.
2. I try to look at everybody's side of a 
disagreement before I make a decision.
3. I sometimes try to understand my friends better
by imagining how things look from their perspective.
4. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't
waste much time listening to other people's arguments.
5. I believe that there are two sides to every 
question and try to look at them both.
6. When I'm upset at someone, I ususally try to "put 
myself in his shoes" for a while.
7. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how 
I would feel if I were in their place.
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Free-Form Self-Description Questionnaire for Tape A
Below are the self-descriptions of the individuals 
appearing on the tape. Please try to match each of them 
to the correct individual by placing the number assigned 
to the description on the line (above) corresponding to 
the seating position of that person,
1. I am definitely not shy around people, but am 
outgoing in almost all aspects of my life. I am very 
competitive and set high standards for myself. I do not 
worry about what other people, outside my family, think 
about me and I don't think I'm very self-conscious. 
However, in close personal relationships, like with my 
family and boyfriend, I am very anxious to please and thus 
often have to re-evaluate my goals. I am very optimistic 
and rebound from problems and defeats rather well. I like 
being challenged mentally and physically (I am an 
athlete). I am very organized and self-disciplined.
2. I am a self-confident person with high self-esteem.
I find that when I am a part of a group project or 
organization, I assume the leadership positions and strive 
to be the best at what I do.
I also enjoy friendly competition. I enjoy seeing 
others reach their highest level of potential. I feel 
friendly competition is the means to help motivate each 
other to do greater accomplishments.
Although I am goal-oriented, I find myself drawn to 
people and their problems. I am a good listener and take 
time to evaluate my own opinions and comments before I 
help counsel others.
I can be very introspective —  striving always to 
better myself —  while at the same time I feel I have an 
outgoing personality and love to do spontaneous things 
with friends.
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3. I feel I'm basically easy to get along with. I don't 
have a bad temper and am pretty easygoing about things.
At first, I'm shy unless I know people; and I am very 
accepting of other people. I feel I am very tolerant and 
patient. I let few things bother me. I try to make the 
best of everything —  I guess I'm basically optimistic. I 
can get very emotional at times. I don't see myself as 
selfish or aggressive in my behavior.
4. I am a sincere and honest person, yet I think I act 
differently in different situations. With my close 
friends, or people younger than me, I am funny (the 
clown), outgoing, and assertive. I tend, in larger groups 
of people that I don't know, to be quieter and I may even 
be less than assertive. I could be characterized then as 
shy. Not withdrawn —  I can and like to talk to strangers 
and will be funny —  but I don't shine and present the 
definite personality that I do with close friends.
I like people, and would never consciously be mean to 
someone else. Yet if I perceive them to be mean people —  
I can't stand that, and that would make me dislike them.
I don't hate anyone really (well, maybe some people) but I 
do have definite likes, loves, and dislikes. I'm not 
really a wishy-washy about things.
5. Basically I view myself as somewhat of a "Free- 
spirit." I have many interests in many different areas 
and enjoy diversity in my life. One of the most important 
values which I try to incorporate into every aspect of my 
life is integrity. I firmly believe that everything I, or 
anyone for that matter, does should reflect that person's 
individuality and responsibility for action.
I believe I am viewed by others as much more extreme 
than I really am. I realize that at times I project this 
image (of an extremist) purposefully. I love being alive 
and thinking about the world. I tend to be rather 
introspective. I am loyal and will fight for what I 
believe.
Do you personally know any of the people appearing on
the tape? ____
If so, which one(s)? _________________________________
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Free-Form Self-Description Questionnaire for Tape B
Below are the self-descriptions of the individuals 
appearing on the tape. Please try to match each of them 
to the correct individual by placing the number assigned 
to the description on the line (above) corresponding to 
the seating position of that person.
1. Someone once described me as a nervous perfectionist, 
which probably sums it all up! I am very self-conscious of 
how others view me —  the picture of myself that I present 
to others. My ideals and values are very important to me 
for this reason. The beliefs I hold, especially my 
religious beliefs, don't waver very easily. As far as the 
perfectionist side, it results in a lot of internal drive, 
but a lot of external nervousness. When I don't do 
something to perfection (or to my best standards), I am 
disappointed in myself.
I consider myself responsible and dependable, 
although sometimes too overly conscious of this fact 
(making me somewhat of a pest!). Believe it or not, I am 
also extremely shy around people I don't know. Large 
growds bother me! But when I do know people well, the 
shyness is not that apparent. Then I am almost overly 
sensitive and my emotions sometimes (usually) rule. The 
people I am close to are very important to me.
2. I see myself as a caring person —  caring about other 
people, and caring about things I do, sometimes to the 
point of nervousness and worry. I enjoy doing things for 
others and giving. At the same time, I am a very 
introspective person, and I value my own "space" a lot. I 
am mostly relaxed when I am alone. I am usually enthuastic 
and full of energy, constantly looking for new things to 
do. I see myself as an intense person —  I am either 
involved in constant activity or deep, purposeful 
thinking. I get restless during "in between" situations, 
such as watching TV for a long time.
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3, I see myself as someone who cares a lot about other 
people. I enjoy working with them and helping them. I try 
to do what I feel is right and not what others think I 
should do. My basic attitude towards life is fairly laid 
back and relaxed. At times I procrastinate but I get 
everything done in the long run. When there is something 
I believe in or that I enjoy doing I work really hard at 
it.
4. I am generally rather introverted in non-purposeful 
gatherings or in situations in which I have nothing to 
offer the group (i.e., I am quiet when I don't know about 
the topic of discussion). However, I am a good listener, 
organized, and have adequate leadership skills. I am 
generally more confortable conversing with members of the 
opposite sex, and prefer small gatherings to larger 
parties.
I am creative and consider my best "virtue" my 
flexibility. I take initiative and follow through in doing 
new activities (i.e, spelunking, traveling, whatever). It 
irritates me when a person seems enthuastic about 
something and then "backs out." In general, I am very 
open about my feelings.
5. I am a fairly independent person that is very 
interested in the welfare of others. I like for people 
around me to be happy. However, I can be very impatient at 
times which can be detrimental in my relationships with 
others. I love to work with kids because they are so open 
and honest about what they think. There is no need to 
second guess how they are feeling.
I am a person that unfortunately tends to let things 
get to me, so handling stress better is something I am 
working on. Self-improvement is a goal I think all people 
have, and I would say I am very goal-oriented. Success, 
though, is being happy with yourself and for me that 
includes good relationships with others, without 
sacrificing my independence.
Do you personally know any of the people appearing on the 
tape?____
If so, which one(s)? ___ ________ ____ ___________________
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Self-Descriptive Adjective List Questionnaire for Tape B
Each person appearing on the videotape was asked to write 
down five to ten adjectives that she thought were 
characteristic of her. Those adjectives are listed below. 
Please read each list carefully, and decide who it belongs 
to. The lists are in a random order; your task is to 
match each list with the correct individual by placing the 
number assigned to the list on the line (above) 
corresponding to the seating position of the person you 
think it belongs to.
1. Cooperative 
Easygoing 
Hard-working 
Enthuastic 
Happy 
Energetic 
Sensitive
2. Perfectionist 
Creative 
Shy
Conservative
Dependable
Worrisome
Nervous
3. Enthuastic 
Creative 
Independent 
Adventuresome 
Caring 
Intense
4. Practical 
Creative
Well-disciplined
Compassionate
Spontaneous
5. Impulsive 
Flexible 
Shy
Person-oriented
Hard-working
Diverse
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Confidence Rating Questionnaire
Plese indicate whether you knew any of the persons 
appearing on the videotape, and then aswer the rest of the 
questions by placing a check mark on the line that best 
corresponds to your opinion.
1. Do you personally know any of the people appearing on 
the tape? ____
If so, which one(s)? _________ ________________________
2. Starting from left to right, how confident are you 
that the self-description you chose for the first person 
actually belongs to her?
Not at all Extremely
confident s : s : : : s : confident
3. Starting from left to right, how confident are you 
that the self-description you chose for the second person 
actually belongs to her?
Not at all Extremely
confident : : : : : : : : confident
4. Starting from left to right, How confident are you 
that the self-description you chose for the third person 
actually belongs to her?
Not at all Extremely
confident s s s : : : : : confident
5. Starting from left to right, how confident are you 
that the self-description you chose for the fourth person 
actually belongs to her?
Not at all Extremely
confident s : : : : :____ : : confident
6. Starting from left to right, How confident are .you 
that the self-description you chose for the fifth person 
actually belongs to her?
Not at all Extremely
confident :____ :____ :____ s____ :____ :____ : : confident
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